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1 Readers in the China field will eagerly turn to Susan Greenhalgh’s latest work for an
indepth treatment of the formation of China’s one-child policy, but they will find much
more here. This volume exemplifies some of the strongest work in the anthropology of
China in the present day, pulling ethnographic research in China into the mainstream
of central debates in contemporary anthropology.
2 Greenhalgh makes two broad types of knowledge claim in this volume, both based on
diverse  ethnographic  techniques.  First,  she  claims  to  explain,  in  considerable
ethnographic and analytic  depth,  the specific  policy-making process through which
China arrived at the one-child-percouple formulation during critical months in 1979-
80.  This  is  a  significant  addition  to  the  comprehensive  work  she  co-authored  with
Edwin Winckler, Governing China’s Population: From Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005). In the present work she examines three
competing scientific groups and their positions, as well as the political and scientific
means through which the contention unfolded. These comprised the population studies
group  at  People’s  University,  led  by  Liu  Zheng  and  others;  the  cybernetic  missile
control scientists led by Song Jian; and the critical voice of Liang Zhongtang of the
Shanxi Party School.
3 The  population  studies  group  was  severely  hampered  by  an  immediate  lack  of
population data and computing facilities, as well as a deeper disadvantage derived from
the  devaluing  and  dismantling  of  the  social  sciences  in  previous  decades.  Liang
Zhongtang  suffered  comparable  disadvantages,  which  even  his  strong  political
legitimacy and roots  in  popular  society  and culture  were  unable  to  overcome.  The
ultimate  decision  was  made  in  favour  of  the  missile  scientists’  argument  that  the
population problem was biological rather than social in nature, and that this prob lem
was both absolutely urgent and effectively controllable by means similar to those used
to create a missile capability for China. The privileged access of the missile control
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scientists to data, computers, international conferences, and the ears of the highest
leadership in China are all traced, as is their deployment of political and discursive
strategies.
4 Second, Greenhalgh argues for what she describes as an epistemic or knowledge-based
approach to an anthropology of policy.
5 She departs from the threshold call of Laura Nader to “study up” by pursuing a study of
China’s  population  policy  that  models  the  approach  of  problematising  what  is
thinkable.  She  is  strongly  informed  here  by  work  in  STS  (science  and  technology
studies),  and  uses  insights  derived  largely  from  work  on  laboratory  science  to
illuminate the science of “population” and the relation between science and policy.
Greenhalgh  had  extraordinary  ethnographic  and  interview  access,  gained  initially
through her ten years with the Population Council. Her long-term personal knowledge
of many of the principal figures and her interview access to them for this study are
essential for the exceptional task of analysing the elite processes that culminated in the
one-child policy decision in 1980. It is perhaps her key argument that contention about
science and the interface between science and policy was decisive in the making of this
policy.  This  underlies  all  of  the  complex  argumentation  about  how the  policy  was
made,  which  she  presents  with  carefully  delineated  and  cited  evidence  (while
protecting confidentiality, where necessary) and judicious and probabilistic language.
This is probably the element of the book most subject to debate, as the official position
is that the decision was a political one made by the top political leaders, with science
being a subsidiary matter.
6 The  exact  process  of  decision-making  by  the  handful  of  top  leaders  (Chen  Yun,  Li
Xiannian,  Deng  Xiaoping,  Chen  Muhua,  and  a  few  others)  may  be  contingent  and
ultimately  unknowable  with  absolute  certainty,  but  readers  will  do  well  to  follow
Greenhalgh  through  these  perilous  waters.  The  voyage  leads  through
problematisations of science, the power of visualisation in diagrams and charts, the
magic of numbers (even when based on doubtful sources), the role of simplification (of
complex processes) and factification, and the importance of linguistic framings. She
also takes us through the mechanisms of elite science policy—its boundary work (and
boundary violations), publication strategies, oratory and management of resources and
connections.
7 A recurrent and culminating argument is the descent of science into scientism and the
perils this holds in a world uncritically enamoured of the trappings and questionable
legitimacy of ready scientific (scientistic) explanations and solutions. Lest one imagine
that this is unique or special to China, Greenhalgh shows that the one-child policy—
often attributed solely to China—had roots in missile scientists’ exposure to and import
of Club of Rome population concepts through international conferences in the 1970s. A
peculiar  feature  of  the  context  was  the  exceptional  faith  China’s  leaders  placed  in
Western  science,  which  contributed  to  the  scientism  that  legitimated  the  onechild
policy.  Similarly,  the  political  lines  are  shown  to  be  at  odds  with  stereotypical
interpretations of Chinese politics. The decisive proponents of the view of population
as a matter of biology and its quantitative control were an integral segment of China’s
new elite, and while politically well-connected, they had been somewhat removed and
protected from ordinary political involvement or rustication due to their contributions
to  China’s  missile  control  technology.  The  specialists  at  People’s  University  had
political vulnerabilities associated with earlier political campaigns and a lower status as
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social scientists that hampered their ability to speak out. The spokesperson closest to
revolutionary political culture, Liang Zhongtang, described by Greenhalgh as a Marxist
humanist, was the one who paid the greatest attention to the social impact of the one-
child policy, especially for the elderly (but less so for women), and was able to urge a
more socially responsive and gradual approach. Greenhalgh’s study is grounded in an
in-depth case study of this turning point in China’s most important policy of the late
twentieth  century,  but  it  is  also  a  work  of  ethnology  with  wider  applicability.  She
delineates how momentous scientific authority can be fragile and contingent, how it
requires identifiable practices to make it powerful, and how it resides in the everyday
discourses  of  science  and  politics.  Elite  science  policy  is  not  the  usual  haunt  of
anthropologists, but Greenhalgh and charts, the magic of numbers (even when based
on doubtful sources), the role of simplification (of complex processes) and factification,
and the importance of linguistic framings. She also takes us through the mechanisms of
elite  science  policy—its  boundary  work  (and  boundary  violations),  publication
strategies,  oratory and management of  resources and connections.  A recurrent and
culminating argument is the descent of science into scientism and the perils this holds
in  a  world  uncritically  enamoured  of  the  trappings  and  questionable  legitimacy  of
ready scientific (scientistic) explanations and solutions. Lest one imagine that this is
unique  or  special  to  China,  Greenhalgh  shows  that  the  one-child  policy—  often
attributed solely to China—had roots in missile scientists’ exposure to and import of
Club of Rome population concepts through international conferences in the 1970s. A
peculiar  feature  of  the  context  was  the  exceptional  faith  China’s  leaders  placed  in
Western  science,  which  contributed  to  the  scientism  that  legitimated  the  onechild
policy.
8 Similarly, the political lines are shown to be at odds with stereotypical interpretations
of Chinese politics. The decisive proponents of the view of population as a matter of
biology and its quantitative control were an integral segment of China’s new elite, and
while politically well-connected, they had been somewhat removed and protected from
ordinary  political  involvement  or  rustication  due  to  their  contributions  to  China’s
missile  control  technology.  The  specialists  at  People’s  University  had  political
vulnerabilities associated with earlier political campaigns and a lower status as social
scientists  that  hampered  their  ability  to  speak  out.  The  spokesperson  closest  to
revolutionary political culture, Liang Zhongtang, described by Greenhalgh as a Marxist
humanist, was the one who paid the greatest attention to the social impact of the one-
child policy, especially for the elderly (but less so for women), and was able to urge a
more socially responsive and gradual approach.
9 Greenhalgh’s  study  is  grounded  in  an  in-depth  case  study  of  this  turning  point  in
China’s most important policy of the late twentieth century, but it is also a work of
ethnology with wider applicability. She delineates how momentous scientific authority
can  be  fragile  and  contingent,  how  it  requires  identifiable  practices  to  make  it
powerful, and how it resides in the everyday discourses of science and politics. Elite
science policy is not the usual haunt of anthropologists, but Greenhalgh aptly frames
this as another instance of the “ethnography in strange places” (p. 312) that is what
anthropologists do. We can be grateful that she has pushed these boundaries and done
so with such rigour and insight.
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